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In 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was amended to reinstate “a 
broad scope of protection” that, since its passage in 1990, had been narrowed 
through a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions (42 U.S.C. § 12101 [b] [1]). 
While the reform was meant to loosen the definition of disability generally, the 
2008 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) also specifically addresses the Court’s 
interpretations of the third prong of the definition—the “regarded as” disabled 
clause. This definition protects individuals who are subjected to discrimination 
based on an employer’s perceptions and assumptions that they are limited by a 
physical or mental impairment. 
This article analyzes the potential impact on public human resource practices of 
the ADAAA. In doing so, the article provides a needed focus on the “regarded as” 
disabled prong of the ADA. The data for this article are Fourth Circuit federal court 
cases decided before the passage of the ADAAA, the ADAAA itself, regulations 
developed as a result of the ADAAA, and federal cases decided in the short time 
since the passage of the 2008 amendments. The analysis concludes that the ADAAA 
brought renewed attention to the workplace-related challenges faced by those with a 
disability, enhanced legal protections, and may tilt the balance toward a more pro- 
employee implementation of measures addressing disability discrimination. The 
extent of this tilt, and its implications for human resource management practitioners, 
is less clear. 
This article first provides a brief overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, including related scholarly work on this topic and an introduction to the 
“regarded as” definition of disabled. Next is a review of how “regarded as” disabled 
has been interpreted and impacted by key Supreme Court decisions. A discussion of 
the ADAAA as a congressional response to the decisions of the Supreme Court fol 
lows. The article then explores how an analysis of pre-ADAAA cases can inform the 
impact the 2008 amendments will have on employer practices. Specifically, the analy- 
sis explores which cases would likely result in the same outcome pre and post-ADAAA 
and which may have an alternate outcome. The article concludes by highlighting 
implications of the ADAAA on practitioners. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
The 2008 amendments (ADAAA) were intended to reassert the original intent of the 
ADA, not to significantly redefine or alter the fundamentals of the law. Thus, any 
analysis of the ADAAA must begin with a discussion of the ADA itself.
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As it relates to employment, the ADA provides that: 
no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis 
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment. (42 U.S.C. § 12112[a]) 
 
  
 
 
 
Under the ADAAA, individuals must be qualified for the position for which they 
applied or are employed in; employers are not required to overhaul the job description 
or essential duties to suit an individual with actual or perceived impairments; and indi- 
viduals claiming ADA coverage must produce medical evidence verifying their 
impairment and associated limitations. And when making a claim of disability-related 
discrimination, the individual bears the burden of making a prima facie case that dis- 
crimination has occurred.
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Since it passage, the ADA has rightly been considered a landmark piece of legisla- 
tion because of its wide-reaching protections for people with disabilities. Accordingly, 
scholarly analysis has focused on numerous aspects of the ADA (see Mezey, 2005; 
Switzer, 2003). A consistent stream of research focused on individuals with disabilities 
in the workplace has demonstrated that, while significant progress has been made, 
alleviating barriers to nondiscriminatory employment opportunities remains an elu- 
sive goal (Kim, 2007; Lee, 1999; Lewis & Allee, 1992). Others have focused on the 
challenges of providing reasonable accommodations (Crampton & Hodge, 2003) and 
accounting for the relevance of mitigating measures in the determination of disability 
(Massengill, 2004). The extent to which the ADA impacts state and local government 
has received the bulk of attention in Public Administration scholarship (Condrey & 
Brudney, 1998; Cozzetto, 1994; Kellough, 2000; Koenig, 1998; Kuykendall & 
Lindquist, 2001; Riccucci, 2003; Slack, 1996).
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While there is still a need for addi- 
tional research on all aspects of the ADA, there is little public human resources man- 
agement literature about the “regarded as” definition of disability (Bradbury, 2007; 
Jenero & Schreiber, 2000; Rush, 2012). 
The “regarded as” prong is one of three prongs in the ADA’s definition of disability: 
the first protects individuals who have a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities; the second applies to those who have a history or 
record of such an impairment; and the third prong applies to individuals who are “regarded 
as” having such an impairment. While all three prongs suffer from a lack of definitional 
clarity (Rush, 2012), the “regarded as” definition is particularly complex in concept and 
application. In the context of the workplace, the “regarded as” prong protects workers 
who have been subject to an adverse employment action because the employer assumed 
that the employee suffered from a disability that prevented him or her from fulfilling 
required job responsibilities. The third prong protects against discrimination based on an 
unsubstantiated assumption made by the employer as to the employee’s capabilities, and 
assumed limitations; consequently, the employee need not actually suffer from a condi- 
tion that would otherwise be covered by the first or second prong of the ADA’s definition 
of disability. Formally stated, the ADA defines “regarded as” disabled as: 
 
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an 
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical 
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to 
limit a major life activity. (42 U.S.C. § 12102 [3] [a]) 
 
 
 
One of the primary purposes of the ADAAA was to expand the coverage afforded by 
the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s definition of disability. 
 
“Regarded as” Disabled and the Supreme Court 
In light of the original intent of the ADA to provide broad coverage and “a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against indi- 
viduals with disabilities,” the prevailing judicial interpretation of the “regarded as” 
definition had become increasingly at odds with the initial congressional intent 
(42 U.S.C. § 12101 [b] [1]). In the two decades since passage of the ADA, Congress 
concluded that “courts have incorrectly found . . . that people with a range of 
substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities” (42 U.S.C. § 
12101 note [a] [6]). 
The Supreme Court first articulated its interpretation of “regarded as” disabled in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline (1987). The Court noted “an impairment 
might not diminish a person’s physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless 
substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of 
others to the impairment” (p. 282). This characterization of disability was designed to 
protect individuals who either are not substantially limited by their condition or do not 
have any condition, but are subjected to discrimination based on the perception that 
they are limited by a physical or mental impairment (p. 279). “Regarded as” disabled 
hinges on the perceptions and stereotypes of the employer in relation to a person’s 
ability to work. 
The Court narrowed the interpretation of “regarded as” in two subsequent cases. In 
Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999) much of the dispute focused on the definition of 
“regarded as” as stated in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) 
Implementing Guidelines of the ADA: 
 
1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major 
life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; 
2) has a(n) . . . impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as 
a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 3) has none of the 
impairments defined in . . . this section but is treated . . . as having a substan- 
tially limiting impairment. (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[1]) 
 
The majority opinion of the Court stated that the determination of whether an impair- 
ment substantially limits a major life activity (e.g., working) must be considered in 
light of measures taken that mitigate the effects of the impairment (e.g., medication). 
In addition, the decision clarified the extent to which a disability has to affect “work- 
ing” to be covered under the ADA. The Court affirmed the EEOC Guideline (29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2 [j] [3]) that an individual must be unable to work in a broad range of 
jobs, rather than a single, particular job, when making a work-based claim. This would 
mean that a person would not find coverage under the ADA if they were excluded 
 
 
 
from working in their preferred job but could hold other positions within the same 
profession or organization. 
The second case that notably narrowed the definition of “regarded as” was Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams (2001). Ella William’s carpal tunnel syndrome made 
it difficult for her to perform manual tasks, particularly those associated with her 
assembly line job. To create a “demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” the 
Court insisted that merely suffering from an impairment does not make one disabled 
under the ADA (p. 197). In a unanimous opinion, the Court emphasized that the limita- 
tion on a major life activity must be substantial. To be considered a substantial limita- 
tion, the performance of the manual tasks at issue must also be considered on a 
case-by-case basis, be permanent or long-term, and be “of central importance to most 
people’s daily lives” (p. 198). 
The Sutton and Toyota rulings made it difficult for individuals to succeed with a 
“regarded as” claim; the Court created standards that could be described as proman- 
agement or proemployer (Crampton & Hodge, 2003). As a result, the burden fell on 
the individual to demonstrate (a) that the employer believed, however erroneously, 
that the plaintiff suffered from an impairment that, if it truly existed, would be covered 
under the statutes and (b) that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff on the 
basis of that perceived impairment. Thus, the applicant or employee had to demon- 
strate conclusively that the employer perceived that a disability existed and that the 
employer’s actions toward the impairment had the effect of substantially limiting 
the major life activity of working. Furthermore, the Sutton decision’s requirement that 
the consequences of mitigating measures be considered when making a disability 
determination made it even more difficult for individuals to succeed in an ADA claim 
(Jenero & Schreiber, 2000). Mezey (2005) argued that the effects of these cases made 
the ADA “a nullity for many individuals” and led to pressure from disability rights 
advocates on Congress to reassert the ADA’s coverage (p. 55, 58). 
 
ADAAA—Reasserting Congressional Intent 
The ADAAA, and the corresponding regulations promulgated in 2012, explicitly 
intends to make it easier for individuals to have their impairments meet the defini- 
tions of “disabled” and, in doing so, rejects much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Sutton and Toyota.
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This is accomplished by expanding the definition of “major 
life activities” beyond traditional activities, such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, and working, to now 
include the operation of major bodily functions, such as the functioning of the 
immune, respiratory, and neurological systems. The ADAAA also relaxes the legal 
definition of what constitutes an impairment that is “substantially limiting” to any of 
these activities or bodily functions. Furthermore, the ADAAA explicitly overturns 
critical parts of the Sutton ruling by directing that the positive effects mitigating 
measures be ignored in the determination of whether an impairment constitutes a 
disability. However, the negative effects of such mitigating measures can be 
 
 
 
 
 
considered when assessing whether a condition would substantially limit the perfor- 
mance of a major life activity. Thus, a “regarded as” claim can be based on the use 
of a mitigating measure, such as the taking of medicine to control a condition, even 
if the employer is not knowledgeable of the underlying impairment. Lastly, the 
ADAAA clarifies that those impairments that are episodic or in remission may meet 
the definition of disability, though temporary or nonchronic conditions are explicitly 
prohibited from coverage under the “regarded as” definition but can be used to jus- 
tify a claim under the first two prongs. 
In addition, the ADAAA pointedly modifies the “regarded as” definition of disabil- 
ity by restoring the reasoning set forth in the Arline decision. Now, an applicant or 
employee seeking “regarded as” coverage need only show that the employer viewed 
the individual as having an impairment. Individuals no longer have the burden of dem- 
onstrating that the employer believed that the impairment, or perceived impairment, 
substantially limited the performance of a major life activity (EEOC, 2009). A quali- 
fied individual must only show that the employer engaged in a prohibited action, such 
as a discriminatory failure to hire, promote, or terminate, based on a real or perceived 
impairment.
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The ADAAA also addresses the major life activity of “working.” Individuals must 
still show that their condition limits their ability to perform a class or range of jobs to 
gain ADA coverage related to “working.” The regulations make clear, however, the 
following: 
 
The determination of coverage under the laws should not require extensive and 
elaborate assessment, and the EEOC and the courts are to apply a lower stan- 
dard in determining when an impairment substantially limits a major life activ- 
ity, including . . . working, than they applied prior to the Amendments Act. 
(Regulations, Sections 1630.2(j)(5) and (6)) 
 
While this guidance falls short of overturning the relevant aspects of the Sutton and 
Toyota decisions, the regulations echo the stated purpose of the ADAAA. 
It is important to note that the ADAAA did not alter, in any way, the employer’s 
opportunity to rebut an individual’s claim of disability discrimination. The employer 
may still offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse personnel 
action taken that is being presented as discriminatory. Although the individual may, in 
turn, refute the employer’s explanation as being merely a pretext for disability dis- 
crimination, this remains a high hurdle for an individual to make a successful claim of 
discrimination. 
The ADAAA intends to shift the balance from a decidedly proemployer position to 
one that will make it easier for individuals to meet the definitions of disability, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that they will be afforded relief from the ADA. Ideally, the 
ADAAA will result in proactive actions by public human resource managers to show 
a greater sensitivity toward individuals with disabilities; such a managerial disposition 
will, hopefully, trigger fewer accusations of disability-related discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Pre-ADAAA Cases 
As with all reforms, it is difficult to predict the impact of the ADAAA on future 
“regarded as” cases. It is important, nevertheless, to consider the potential impact on 
the behavior of employers. Reforms can require an entirely new process of manage- 
ment or simply reinforce current practices. Congress’s intent for the ADAAA to redi- 
rect judicial disposition may, or may not, come to fruition (see Bishop & Jones, 1993). 
The ADAAA went into effect on January 1, 2009, and covers personnel actions from 
that date forward. Since the modified protections afforded by the ADAAA cannot be 
applied retroactively, only a small number of related federal court decisions have been 
issued at the time of this writing. Some years must pass before a critical mass of fed- 
eral case law develops. This case law can then be analyzed to definitively ascertain 
the reform’s impact on disability cases and on associated human resource practices 
and policies. In the meantime, a systematic analysis of past “regarded as” cases 
viewed through the lens of the new ADAAA standards can reveal the manner in which 
Congress intends outcomes in such cases to change. The analysis can determine the 
degree to which the ADAAA may, or may not, affect future disability-related cases in 
the federal system. Indeed, such a “past as prologue” approach was used in the 
ADAAA’s regulations to demonstrate the intended impact of the reform (Regulations 
to Implement, 2012). 
To understand how the reform is likely to impact employers, employees, and the 
courts, all cases argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and 
district courts within, since the passage of the ADA that included actual judicial 
deliberation on the issue of “regarded as” disabled were identified.
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The Fourth 
Circuit has a reputation for being comparatively conservative, or promanagement, in 
employment-related cases (Weiss, 2009). Colker (2001) compares the courts on ADA 
rulings and finds the Fourth Circuit to be significantly more likely to produce prode- 
fendant (employer) results. Thus, it is likely that a relatively high number of Fourth 
Circuit cases that were decided in favor of the employer may be viewed differently 
post-ADAAA. 
This analysis examines how employer responsibility and managerial actions may 
be impacted by the new ADAAA changes. By evaluating a circuit that has more tradi- 
tionally had a more proemployer stance, the implications for change and impact are 
maximized. While interpretations of the ADAAA will likely vary across the federal 
circuits (see BBI 2006a, 2006b; Colker, 2001; Stanley, 2006), this research does not 
intend to predict changes in judicial temperament or interpretation. Case facts and an 
observed typology of decisions illustrate the potential impacts of the reforms and 
reflect on the impact on needed managerial behavior. Thus, the importance of this case 
review lies not in the rate or ratio of cases from the Fourth Circuit that may be decided 
differently in the future, but rather to ascertain whether a critical mass of federal ADA 
cases might be viewed differently per the ADAAA. 
The cases examined in this study were selected through a four-part process. First, 
using Shepard’s Citations Service, ADA-related cases were identified (5,611). This pool 
 
 
 
 
 
was narrowed to cases in which the issue of “regarded as having such an impairment” 
was raised (2,000 cases remained), and then further narrowed to cases within the Fourth 
Circuit (196 cases). Of these 196 cases, 88 were identified has having considered the 
issue of “regarded as” disabled.
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Cases were reviewed to collect the facts of the original 
cases, the findings by the original courts, and the judicial reasoning. Each fact pattern 
was evaluated to determine how changes embodied in the ADAAA would likely impact 
the results in future cases with similar fact patterns. The analysis was informed by the 
ADAAA’s statutory language, legislative intent (evident in committee reports and the 
Congressional Record), and insights from secondary sources (academic and law journal 
articles). This review allows for an evaluation of how the outcomes of previous cases 
might change as the ADAAA is applied to future controversies with similar fact patterns 
across the federal court system, assuming that congressional intent is reflected in judicial 
interpretation.
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Where appropriate, the small number of post-ADAAA decisions are ref- 
erenced; these provide an initial indication of judicial interpretation and application of 
the ADAAA.
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The review of the 88 pre-ADAAA cases revealed a two-category scheme whereby 
the results of some cases would likely remain the same in the aftermath of the ADAAA 
and the outcome of others might change.
10 
The first category consists of cases in which 
the projected outcome would not change for one of two primary reasons: either inad- 
equate evidence was presented to support the individual’s claim and the amendments 
would not sufficiently loosen evidentiary standards to alter a proemployer determina- 
tion, or the individual’s claim succeeded under the previously narrow context of the 
original ADA would not change under the ADAAA. The second category consists of 
cases that may see an alternative, post-ADAAA interpretation; as concluded by Rush 
(2012), the enduring uncertainty over the definition of “disability” in the ADAAA 
means that it will ultimately be left to the courts to resolve. These two categories of 
cases will be discussed in turn. 
 
Same Outcome 
The reform to the ADA is not intended to change the outcome of weak cases or strong 
cases, nor is it intended to change the standard for frivolous lawsuits. Similarly, cases 
that were successful under the previous standards, because of the strength of the evi- 
dence and the nature of the violation, would likely result in the same outcomes. 
Insufficient evidence. Twenty-five of the 88 cases from the Fourth Circuit would 
likely have the same outcome post-ADAAA because the evidence presented by the 
complainant was not strong enough to survive summary judgment and progress to trial 
(i.e., this lack of evidence was not enough in previous cases and would still remain 
inadequate). Under the ADAAA, the plaintiff must present evidence that the employer 
believed the employee had an impairment, and that this impairment was the reason for 
the adverse employment action. In many of the cases in this category, the plaintiff 
asserted claims that he or she was both disabled and that he or she was ‘regarded as’ 
disabled, but failed to provide adequate evidence to support either claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
Scott v. Montgomery County Government (2001) epitomizes such cases. Here, the 
employee was hired as a part-time messenger/clerk and his duties entailed driving. The 
employee was diagnosed with sleep apnea and it was determined that he was not able 
to drive in a safe manner. The employer was not under an obligation to accommodate 
the employee by assigning him to permanent light duty, and a part-time schedule 
would not reduce the risk that the employee would experience somnolence while driv- 
ing since it was unpredictable and unaffected by how much sleep he had the previous 
night. The court ruled that the employer’s policy of restricting priority reconsideration 
for positions at or below current grade level was reasonable, and the accommodations 
provided by the employer were reasonable and met the good faith standard of the 
claim of reasonable accommodation. The fact that the employee could not reasonably 
perform the job for which he applied was an acceptable reason for termination. Under 
the ADAAA, employers are not required to hire or continue employees not capable of 
safely performing the job in question. 
A post-ADAAA decision affirms the expectation that relatively weak cases will 
still not prevail under the newly loosened standards. A decision from the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Thornton v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2009) states: 
 
We note that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 . . . became effective on 
January 1, 2009. That Act expanded the definition of “disability” from the strict 
requirements laid out in Toyota. Our conclusion here, however, is unaffected, as 
(1) the Act is not retroactive; and (2) even under a broader definition of disabil- 
ity, Mr. Thornton has not presented sufficient evidence to survive summary 
judgment. 
 
A second post-ADAAA decision exemplifies the enduring proemployer aspects of 
disability discrimination litigation. In Cohen v. CHLN (2011), the district court of the 
East District of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiff did satisfy the newly loosened 
definition of disabled. However, the employer was able to demonstrate a nondis- 
criminatory justification for the plaintiff’s termination, and thereby won the case. This 
decision indicates both what has changed, and what has not, in the post-ADAAA 
context. 
Sufficient evidence. A second category of cases would likely retain the previous out- 
come because the complainant presented a strong evidentiary case that survived sum- 
mary judgment and proceeded to a jury trial under the more narrow, pre-ADAAA 
standards. In such cases employers’ discriminatory actions or motivations were clear. 
The employers’ behavior in these cases involved clear violations of the narrow stan- 
dards for the ADA as set by previous courts and would be unaffected by the broader 
standards of the ADAAA. Nineteen of the cases fit into this category. These cases 
consistently involved the employer clearly stating why he or she did not hire or pro- 
mote the employee, and this reason was prohibited by the ADA. 
For example, in Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co. (2008), the employee had 
Parkinson’s disease but was still able to perform the essential functions of his job as a 
 
 
 
 
shipping supervisor. The employee was terminated after disclosure of his condition. In 
this case, the employee was terminated and was able to provide evidence that the 
employer’s president had stated that the employee qualified for ADA designation; the 
employer discounted a specialist’s medical opinion that the employee was capable of 
returning to work; management shunned the employee; and the employer inaccurately 
believed that the employee was unable to adequately key information into a computer, 
write, count washers, or use information on a computer screen. In response to the law- 
suit, the employer claimed that the employee was terminated as part of a company- 
wide work force reduction. The district court found this reason to be pretextual based 
on evidence that the only other worker affected by a purported workforce reduction 
was transferred to another job and that another worker who was promoted to a newly 
created position of shipping foreman performed the same duties as the employee 
bringing the suit. Thus, the court found the employer’s reasons for termination to be 
excuses rather than permissible justifications under the ADA. 
A post-ADAAA case supports the conclusions in this grouping of cases. In Rorh v. 
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (2009), the Ninth 
Circuit noted that claims that succeeded under the pre-ADAAA standards would only 
be strengthened by the reform: 
 
At the outset, we note that on September 25, 2008, while this decision was 
pending, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) was signed into law 
in order . . . Although the ADAAA, if applicable, would provide additional sup- 
port for Rohr’s claims in this case, we hold that, even under our pre-ADAAA 
case law, Rohr provided sufficient evidence that he was a “qualified individual” 
with a “disability” under the ADA to survive summary judgment. 
 
 
Uncertain Outcome 
The ADAAA clearly establishes that “regarded as” disabled now only requires that the 
employee show that the employer viewed him or her as having an impairment. The 
employee no longer needs to show that he or she was regarded as having an impairment 
that substantially limited a major life activity. The analysis of cases found almost half 
(40 of 88) 
11 
of the employees bringing suit lost their case even though they produced 
evidence that they were regarded as impaired; they were not, however, sufficiently 
impaired to qualify for protection under the previous ADA requirements. These cases 
were mostly decided under the reasoning of the Sutton and Toyota decisions; the 
employer believed that the employee was impaired but not substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working. The employer in these cases regarded the employee as 
unable to perform the job in question but not necessarily limited in his or her ability to 
work in a class, or broad range, of jobs as required by the previous ADA case law. Future 
“regarded as” cases would be evaluated under the ADAAA’s revised standard that 
exempts the employee from needing to demonstrate any degree of limitation of a major 
 
 
 
 
 
life activity. Thus, a number of “regarded as” cases with similar fact patterns may be 
more likely to receive a proemployee judgment under the ADAAA. Importantly, the 
ADAAA makes clear that the individuals bringing suit under either of the first two 
prongs of “disability” need only be considered to be substantially limited in any major 
life activity to be considered disabled in the context of working. 
Foore v. Richmond (2001) is a compelling example of this category. Here, a police 
officer who had worked for more than 14 years was placed on disability retirement 
when the department discovered that the vision in his right eye fell below require- 
ments. At trial, the city maintained that Foore was not disabled because his visual 
impairment did not substantially limit any major life activity. The appellate court held 
that the employee did not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The record 
demonstrated that the employee had overcome his impairment, and the only job he had 
been precluded from undertaking was the position of police officer. The court held that 
because the employer believed him to be capable of performing other duties, he was 
not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Under the ADAAA, this 
line of reasoning is less likely to prevail, as the police officer’s disability claim must 
be evaluated both without regard to the positive effects of mitigating measures and in 
light of other major life activities, beyond working, from which the individual may be 
limited in performing. 
With regard to the effects of mitigating measures, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in the post-ADAAA case of Rorh v. Salt River Project Agricultural 
Improvement and Power District (2009) states this logic clearly: 
 
The ADAAA rejects the requirement enunciated in Sutton that whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with 
reference to mitigating measures. Id. The ADAAA makes explicit that the “sub- 
stantially limits” inquiry “shall be made without regard to the ameliorative 
effects of mitigating measures such as . . . medication, medical supplies, equip- 
ment, or appliances . . . ; use of assistive technology; reasonable accommoda- 
tions or auxiliary aids or services; or learned behavioral or adaptive neurological 
modifications.” 
 
Such analysis suggests that judges are respecting the intent of the ADAAA to make it 
easier for individuals to meet the definitions of disability, and thereby tilt the balance 
toward a proemployee interpretation. One interesting example is Broderick v. The 
Research Foundation of SUNY (2010) where the court allowed the plaintiff to replead 
her case with a clarified justification for her claim of disability because the court felt 
it was “flying blind” with regard to the proper application of the newly enacted 
ADAAA (p. 5). In both Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts (2011) and Hoffman v. 
Carefirst of Fort Wayne (2010), the district courts in Texas and Indiana, respectively, 
affirmed that impairments that are in remission meet the ADAAA’s definition of dis- 
ability if they would constitute a disability when active. Lastly, in Rumbin v. AAMC 
(2011), a district court in Connecticut decided that requests for accommodation 
 
 
 
 
sought after the implementation of the ADAAA are covered by the reform, even 
though the preponderance of case facts occurred prior to its implementation. However, 
a district court in New Jersey rejected the same argument in Riley v. Potter (2011) 
because the conduct in question occurred prior to the ADAAA even though the failure 
to accommodate continued after the law’s implementation. 
On the question of the major life activity of “working,” however, the impact of the 
ADAAA is similarly uncertain. In the post-ADAAA case of Azzam v. Baptist 
Healthcare Affiliates (2012), the district court reaffirmed that the plaintiff must be 
limited in performing a class of jobs, and not merely one particular job. While this 
disposition is in keeping with the letter of the ADAAA and its corresponding regula- 
tions, such a decision reminds that the impact of the reform may be modest. 
 
Findings 
This evaluation of past cases in light of the ADAAA leads to a number of conclusions. 
First, although the reform is meant to expand the prevailing definition of disability, a 
notable proportion of claims will still fail to meet the definition and will be dismissed 
on summary judgment for the employer. Similarly, claims that were strong enough to 
meet the prereform standards will fare no worse under the ADAAA. The effect of the 
ADAAA is expected to be observed between these two extremes as the broadened 
definition of disability, and other elements of the law, may result in more “regarded 
as” claims being recognized by federal courts and proceeding to trial. 
Optimism over the expanded impact of the ADAAA must be tempered by the rec- 
ognition that the federal district courts may reach contradictory conclusions regarding 
the applicability and interpretation of the reform. It seems likely that key aspects of the 
ADAAA will require review and clarification from the Supreme Court. Most notably, 
the definition of disability remains unclear in the wake of the ADAAA (Rush, 2012). 
Further, although the ADAAA may make it easier for individuals to meet the defini- 
tions of disabled, employers still reserve the opportunity to rebut allegations of dis- 
crimination by providing a nondiscriminatory justification for any adverse personnel 
actions taken against that individual. And the ADAAA did not, in any way, make it 
more difficult for employers to make such justifications. For this reason primarily, one 
must exercise cautious optimism, at best, with regard to the impact of the ADAAA on 
the outcome of future cases. Similarly, the implications of the ADAAA for the practice 
of public human resource management are uncertain, but require close scrutiny none- 
theless. The results may signal a new reality for human resource management—a real- 
ity in which practices and attitudes that were previously permissible under the ADA 
may be more problematic under the ADAAA. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Increasing employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities has reemerged 
as a national priority in the two decades since the passage of the original ADA (GAO, 
2010). The ADAAA can be seen as intending to alter managerial behavior that may 
 
 
 
 
have become lax. From a practical perspective, the ADAAA represents an important 
shift in employee–employer relations as it relates to disabilities. More employees will 
now have impairments that meet the ADA’s definitions of disability. And lawsuits are 
intended to focus less on whether an individual meets one of the definitions of dis- 
ability, and more on whether there was discrimination or reasonable accommodation 
was provided. Indeed, one of the stated purposes of the reform is that: 
 
The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be 
whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, 
and to convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a 
disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis. (42 U.S.C. § 
12101 note [b] [5]) 
 
The basic motivation for, and consequence of, the ADAAA must be understood 
plainly by managers and supervisors: Congress intends for more individuals to meet 
the definitions of disability. This will increase the number of individuals that qualify 
as having disabilities in the workforce and likely will lead to a greater number of dis- 
ability-related discrimination lawsuits. While a discussion of how to prevail in the face 
of such a proceeding would be valuable, the purpose here is to provide practical advice 
for how to proactively avoid litigation in the first place. Simply put, “it is more desir- 
able to avoid litigious behavior than to emerge victorious in court” (Bradbury, 2007, 
p. 87). Thus, public human resource managers are well advised to adopt a proactive 
strategy that reduces the likelihood of disability-related discrimination. A first step is 
to make employment decisions that are based on valid employment practices and stan- 
dards and are in the best interest of both employees and the organization. 
Avoiding a full-blown conflict over the ADA will likely require a sense of urgency 
and a revisiting of policies and training modules to account for the loosened defini- 
tions of disability in the ADAAA. Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sutton, subse- 
quent cases have raised the bar in terms of what constitutes an impairment that 
“substantially limits” a major life activity. The ADAAA rejects these interpretations 
and reinstates a more relaxed notion of this criterion, making it easier for individuals 
to demonstrate such a limitation. Related, individuals bringing a “regarded as” compli- 
ant no longer must demonstrate a “substantial” limitation at all; they must merely 
demonstrate that the employer believed that they had an impairment. Thus, a far 
greater number and variety of complaints will meet the reformed “regarded as” defini- 
tion of disability. Despite the lack of ‘regarded as’ coverage for transitory or minor 
ailments, an increased number of cases may be based on impairments that are in remis- 
sion or are episodic in nature, as these are explicitly covered under the ADAAA. 
Related, employers ought not to make premature or unsupported conclusions or 
interpretations of the results of medical examinations; few managers have the necessary 
medical expertise to make valid, independent assessments of these exams and ought not 
to try. Employers create trouble for themselves when they presume to be able to make 
medical diagnoses of impairments and limitations, and then make personnel decisions 
based on those presumptions. Employers in the Fourth Circuit cases of Dean v. Philip 
 
 
 
 
Morris USA Inc. (2003), Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Dep’t (2002), and Wilson 
v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co. (2008) erred by acting independently on medical infor- 
mation rather than relying on medical experts. In doing so, employers face an increased 
risk of triggering a “regarded as” disabled claim under the newly loosened standards in 
the ADAAA. Such a risk is magnified in light the requirement that impairments, and 
resulting limitations, be assessed without regard to the positive effects that the use of 
mitigating measures may have. 
This leads to the all-too-familiar admonition for employers to keep comprehensive 
and precise records and documentation for all personnel actions. For ADA-related 
cases in particular, employers should keep documentation of all disability claims, 
accommodation requests, accommodations provided and denied, and the rationale for 
these decisions.
12 
Familiar examples of reasonable accommodations include the acqui- 
sition and/or modification of equipment, job restructuring, modified work schedules, 
reassignment, alternate modes of job-related examinations or assessments, and offer- 
ing varying methods of training (Crampton & Hodge, 2003). A reviewing court is 
likely to evaluate the consistency and equity of an employer’s prior conduct in terms 
of leaves granted, schedules altered, specialized equipment acquired, and other accom- 
modations made for individuals with, and without, disabilities. The surest strategy is 
to bias oneself towards making a reasonable accommodation, and keeping careful 
records of those decisions. It is important to note that although the ADAAA exempts 
employers from making reasonable accommodation in “regarded as” contexts, sound 
managerial practices suggest a flexible, magnanimous, and good faith approach to 
accommodations in and of the workplace. 
Overall, the ADAAA justifies a wholesale revisiting of organizational practices, 
procedures, and policies with regard to individuals with disabilities to ensure compli- 
ance. Similar to the issues of sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination, 
employers should adopt a zero-tolerance stance. But, of course, the adoption of a rig- 
orous policy accomplishes little if it is not implemented in an organization that 
demands vigilant enforcement. Employers are encouraged to reassess their ADA train- 
ing modules in light of emerging evidence that different strategies are more, or less, 
successful depending on the content and audience (U.S. MSPB, 2011). At the very 
least, the 2008 reforms likely justify refresher training for all human resource person- 
nel and other managers with personnel responsibilities. While some may balk at the 
expense of such training, the costs are likely to be dwarfed by those associated with 
defending the organization in even one full-blown ADA lawsuit. 
A critical caveat, however, is in order. The ADAAA’s application to state and local 
government employees, officials, and organizations is complex. Here, concerned par- 
ties are advised to compare the reformed ADA to their state-level disabilities legisla- 
tion to ascertain whether the state version is more or less restrictive, and whether the 
federal ADA applies at all.
13 
Nevertheless, employers at all levels of government 
should to engage in a conversation with applicants and employees whenever disabil- 
ity-related issues arise. Such a “disability conversation” should focus on the skills and 
abilities that are indicated in the job description and are essential for the performance 
 
 
 
 
 
of the job. Employers are advised to refrain from overexplaining to an applicant why 
they were not hired or to an employee why they were terminated, and one should never 
couch such news in terms of the real or perceived disability of the individual. 
Overall, attitudes and predispositions of employers are critical to the impact of the 
ADAAA on the workplace. Employers who view the discussion of disabilities and 
limitations with disdain, and requests for accommodation with suspicion, are more 
likely to be faced with legal complaints in light of the expanded definitions of, and 
loosened standards for, demonstrating a disability under the ADAAA. A reviewing 
court, if a case gets that far, will look to assess the employer’s consistency across cases 
involving individuals with and without disabilities. Thus, employers would do well to 
be consistent across cases, while acknowledging the irony that employers are also 
advised to make individualized assessments.
14 
The ADAAA will certainly create a far 
greater number and variety of disability concerns in the workplace; employers are 
strongly encouraged to adopt a proactive, collaborative, and accommodating mindset 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the reformed ADA. 
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Notes 
1. The purpose of the ADA was to continue and expand employment-related protections for 
people with disabilities as had been established in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; thus, the 
legal rationales and histories of the two acts are intertwined. See Mezey (2005) and Switzer 
(2003) for descriptions of the ways in which the ADA expanded the Rehabilitation Act, 
especially in non-employment related contexts. 
2. The Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) established 
that the plaintiff (i.e. the individual bringing the claim) bears the burden of demonstrating 
that discrimination has likely occurred. This so-called prima facie case is one in which the 
evidence produced is sufficient to support a decision or verdict unless the evidence can be 
rebutted. As the prima facie requirement pertains to the ADA, the plaintiff must show that 
he or she (a) suffers from a disability as defined by at least one of the prongs in the ADA, 
(b) is otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (c) was subject to an adverse employment 
action because of the disability (see Bradbury, 2007). If the court finds that the plaintiff has 
failed to make a successful argument, then the case can be decided in favor of the employer 
 
 
 
 
 
through a device known as summary judgment (i.e. a determination by a court without 
a full trial). If a prima facie case is made, however, the employer may offer legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. Finally, the plaintiff may introduce sufficient 
evidence that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext, or cover story, for actual 
disability discrimination. 
3. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett in 2001, however, greatly diminished the ADA’s subnational coverage. Thus, 
the applicability of the ADAAA to state and local government employers and employ- 
ees varies depending on the state and its disability discrimination law (see Kuykendall 
& Lindquist, 2001; Riccucci, 2003). Further, the ADA does not apply to the federal 
government; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the controlling legislation. 
4. The EEOC’s website has a detailed discussion of the changes to the ADA brought about by 
the ADAAA. 
5. The ADAAA also addresses the issue of employers providing reasonable accom- 
modation for impairments; this is one of the persistently challenging aspects of the 
ADA to implement and enforce. Under the reform, an employer who either asks if an 
employee needs a reasonable accommodation for an apparent impairment or requests 
medical information in an attempt to assess the need for accommodation would not, 
in and of itself, trigger a “regarded as” violation. This last reform is notable because 
it eliminates the requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation for 
those applicants or employees who only meet the “regarded as” definition and not 
one of the other two prongs of the definition of disability (42 U.S.C. § 12201 [h]). 
In doing so, the ADAAA resolved a split that had occurred in the rulings from the 
federal appeals courts as to whether the ADA requires reasonable accommodation for 
individuals “regarded as” disabled (Andrews, 2006; Ring, 2006). Specifically, the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits had ruled that employers are not required to reasonably 
accommodate employees who are “regarded as” while the Third and Eleventh Circuits 
required employers to provide reasonable accommodations. The ADAAA also has the 
effect of rendering moot much of the analyses of the “regarded as” definition in the 
nation’s law reviews, as these tended to focus on the issues of reasonable accommo- 
dation (Andrews 2006; Crain 2005; Donovan, 2005; Dudley, 1999; McFarlin, 2005; 
Ozawa, 2007; Ring, 2006; Rosenthal, 2006), mitigating measures (Warren, 2000), and 
substantial limitation (Ray & Pennington, 2000). The analyses by Danaher (2006), 
Mayerson (1997), and Mish (1998), however, still have much to contribute to post- 
ADAAA understanding of the “regarded as” definition. 
6. The reliance on cases from only one of the 13 federal appeals circuits should not prove 
problematic since they are used merely for illustrative purposes, and not to predict changes 
in judicial temperament or interpretation. 
7. The cases used in our analysis were identified between November 2009 and February 2010 
and are available upon request from the authors. 
8. Thus, our intent is to use a future-oriented perspective to inform how to avoid ADA-related 
disputes. We note that this approach is unusual; law reviews tend to retrospectively analyze 
an existing body of case law. Nevertheless, we believe that our strategy provides an important 
 
 
 
 
and valuable illustration of how the ADAAA reform is intended to affect judicial interpreta- 
tion and disposition, and ultimately the practice of public human resource management. 
9. Over four dozen post-ADAAA cases were identified and examined. The vast majority con- 
cerned case facts that occurred before January 1, 2009, and the decision merely reiterated 
that the reform is not retroactive. Only those few cases where the ADAAA was actually 
part of the decision are discussed herein. 
10. Four cases out the 88 did not fit the classification scheme. 
11. The point is not the precise number, or proportion, of cases for wich the implications of the 
ADAAA may be unclear, but that such a critical mass exists in the Fourth Circuit, and is 
likely to exist in all circuits, because fact patterns tend to be constant throughout the federal 
court system. 
12. The concern over documentation is heightened when considering the discharge of an indi- 
vidual with disabilities. Crampton and Hodge (2003) suggest that medically-based dis- 
charges, in particular, be analyzed to ensure that an accurate assessment of the employee’s 
ability to perform essential job functions is in place. 
13. See Note 3. 
14. Another irony emerges from the strategy of comprehensive documentation. Although 
all employees, including those with disabilities, have performance deficiencies, record- 
keeping is particularly important in contexts that implicate the ADA since therein lies the 
employer’s defense. If, however, the employer is more vigilant in documenting perfor- 
mance deficiencies for employees with disabilities than for nondisabled employees, then a 
self-fulfilling prophesy is triggered whereby a file filled with evidence justifying an adverse 
personnel action exists for an employee with a disability but not for their colleagues. While 
the stereotype of discrimination may revolve around an underestimation of an individual’s 
abilities, it is no less insidious to discriminate on the basis of imbalanced documentation. 
Thus, employers should be equally vigilant in documentation for all employees, regardless 
of the employee’s characteristics or demographics. 
References 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990). 
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008. Public Law 110-325 (2008). 
Andrews, J. D. (2006). Reconciling the split: Affording reasonable accommodations to employ- 
ees “regarded as” disabled under the ADA—An exercise in statutory interpretation. Penn 
State Law Review, 110, 977. 
Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, No. 3:10-cv-362 (District Court for Western District of 
KY Louisville Division 2012). 
Broderick v. The Research Foundation of SUNY (2010). 
Burton Blatt Institute (BBI, 2006a). Diminishing rights under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act: Are people with mental disabilities protected by the ADA in the fouth, fifth, sixth and 
eleventh circuits? (White Paper July 2006). Syracuse, NY: Burton Blatt Institute: Centers of 
Innovation on Disability at Syracuse University. Retrieved from http://bbi.syr.edu/ 
Burton Blatt Institute (BBI, 2006b). Reassignment as an ADA reasonable accommodation in the 
manufacturing industries of the southeast DBTAC region: Comparing appellate court cut- 
 
 
 
 
comes (White Paper August 2006). Burton Blatt Institute, Syracuse, NY: Centers of Innova- 
tion on Disability at Syracuse University. Retrieved from http://bbi.syr.edu/ 
Bishop, P. C., & Jones, A. J. (1993). Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: 
Assessing the variables of success. Public Administration Review, 53, 121-128. 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
Bradbury, M. D. (2007). The legal and managerial challenge of obesity as a disability: Evidence 
from the federal courts. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 27, 1-14. 
Cohen v. CHLN, No. 10-00514 (District Court for the Eastern District of PA 2011). 
Colker, R.. (2001). Winning and losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Ohio State 
Law Journal, 62, 239-283. 
Condrey, S. E., & Brudney, J. L. (1998). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Assessing 
its implementation in America’s largest cities. American Review of Public Administration, 
28, 26-42. 
Cozzetto, D. A. (1994). Implications of the ADA for state and local government: Judicial activ- 
ism reincarnated. Public Personnel Management, 23(1), 105-116. 
Crain, C. A. (2005). The struggle for reasonable accommodation for “regarded as” disabled 
individuals. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 74, 167. 
Crampton, S. M., & Hodge, J. W. (2003). The ADA and disability accommodations. Public 
Personnel Management, 32(1), 143-154. 
Danaher, M. G. (2006). To be regarded as disabled an employee must be perceived as unable to 
perform a variety of jobs. Lawyers Journal, 8, 2. 
Dean v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13035 (M.D.N.C. July 29, 2003). 
Donovan, M. E. (2005). Issues in the third circuit: How bizarre? The third circuit’s analysis of 
the requirement of reasonable accommodation for “regarded as” disabled employees under 
the ADA in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department. Villanova Law 
Review, 50, 1213. 
Dudley, A. (1999). Rights to reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act for “regarded as” disabled individuals. George Mason Law Review, 7, 389. 
EEOC. (2009). Notice concerning the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adaaa_notice. 
cfm 
Foore v. Richmond, 6 Fed. Appx. 148 (4th Cir. Va. 2001). 
GAO. (2010). Highlights of a forum: Actions that could increase work participation for adults 
with disabilities (GAO-10-812SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, No. 1:09-cv-251 (District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana Fort Wayne Division 2010). 
Jenero, K. A., & Schreiber, P. M. (2000). The next generation of ADA claims: The 
“regarded as” prong of the definition of disability. Employee Relations Law Journal, 
26(1), 99-109. 
Kellough, J. E. (2000). The American with Disabilities Act: A note on personnel policy impacts 
in state government. Public Personnel Review, 29, 211-224. 
Kim, C.-K. (2007). Federal employees with disabilities with regards to occupation, race, and 
gender. Public Personnel Management, 36(2), 115-125. 
 
 
 
 
Koenig, H. (1998). The Americans with Disabilities Act: Who isn’t covered? Public Administra 
tion Review, 58, 471-473. 
Kuykendall, C. L., & Lindquist, S. A. (2001). Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett: Implications for public personnel management. Review of Public Personnel Admin- 
istration, 21, 65-69. 
Lee, R. D. (1999). The Rehabilitation Act and federal employment: The court’s application of 
the law. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 19, 45-64. 
Lewis, G. B., & Allee, C. L. (1992). The impact of disabilities on federal career success. Public 
Administration Review, 52, 389-397. 
Massengill, D. (2004). How much better are you? Impairments, mitigating measures and the 
determination of disability. Public Personnel Management, 33, 181-199. 
Mayerson, A. B. (1997). Defining the parameters of coverage under the Americans with Dis- 
abilities Act: Who is “an individual with disability?” Article: Restoring regard for the 
“regarded as” prong: Giving effect to congressional intent. Villanova Law Review, 42, 587. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
McFarlin, T. J. (2005). If they ask for a stool . . . Recognizing reasonable accommodation for 
employees “regarded as” disabled. Saint Louis University Law Journal, 49, 927. 
Mezey, S. G. (2005). Disabling interpretations: The Americans with Disabilities Act in federal 
court. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Mish, R. M. (1998). “Regards as disabled” claims under the ADA: Safety net or catch-all? Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor & Employment Law, 1, 155. 
Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, No. 4:10-cv-00091 (District Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas Sherman Division 2011). 
Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Dep’t, 187 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2002). 
Ozawa, A. (2007). Reasonable accommodation for those “regarded as” disabled: Why requiring 
it will create positive incentives for employees. Columbia Business Law Review, 2007, 313. 
Ray, J. C. Esq., & Pennington, S. S. Esq. (2000). The Americans with Disabilities Act—Past 
present and future: Developing law over a decade: The substantial limitation approach to 
defining disability: Why does it create an insurmountable barrier to individuals who are 
regarded as disabled? Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review, 9, 333. 
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix to Pt. 1630. 2012 ed. 
Riccucci, N. M. (2003). The U.S. supreme court’s new federalism and its impact on antidis- 
crimination legislation. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 23, 3-22. 
Riley v. Potter, No. 08-5167 (District Court for NJ 2011). 
Ring, K. J. (2006). Disabling the split: Should reasonable accommodations be provided to 
“regarded as” disabled individuals under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)? 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 20, 311. 
Rorh v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2856 (9th Cir. Ariz., February 13, 2009). 
Rosenthal, L. D. (2006). Reasonable accommodations for individuals regarded as having dis- 
abilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Why “no” should not be the answer. 
Seton Hall Law Review, 36, 895. 
 
 
 
 
Rumbin v. Association of American Medical Colleges, No. 3:08cv983 (District Court for CT 
2011). 
Rush, C. L. (2012). Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act: Shifting equal employment 
opportunity obligations in public human resource management. Review of Public Personnel 
Administration, 32, 75-86. 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
Scott v. Montgomery County Gov’t, 164 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D. Md. 2001). 
Slack, J. D. (1995). The Americans with Disabilities Act and the workplace: Management’s 
responsibilities in AIDS-related situations. Public Administration Review, 55, 365-370. 
Slack, J. D. (1996). Workplace preparedness and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Lessons 
from municipal governments’ management of HIV/AIDS. Public Administration Review, 
56, 159-167. 
Stanley, R. A. (2006). Diminishing rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Are people 
with mental disabilities protected by the ADA in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eleventh circuits? 
(Prepared for Shelley Kaplan, Director; Southeast Disability and Business Technical Assis- 
tance Center). Retrieved from http://www.sedtac.org 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
Switzer, J. V. (2003). Disabled rights: American disability policy and the fight for equality. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Thornton v. United Parcel Service, Inc, 587 F. 3d 27 (2009). 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2001). 
U.S. MSPB. (2011). Setting expectations: What training is most likely to succeed? Issues of 
merit, April 2011. Washington, DC: Author. 
Warren, B. J. (2000). When determining whether an ADA claimant is disabled, the claimant’s 
impairment must be considered in light of corrective measures, and failure to meet DOT 
regulations does not establish that the claimant was regarded as disabled: Murphy v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc. Duquesne University Law Review, 38, 1143. 
Weiss, D. C. (2009). 4th Circuit judge argues against court’s “ideological makeover.” Retrieved 
on June 25, 2010, from http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/4th_circuit_judge_argues_ 
against_courts_ideological_makeover/ 
Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., No. 06-1818 (4th Cir. VA 2008). 
 
Bios 
Mark D. Bradbury (PhD, University of Georgia) is the Director of the MPA program and an 
Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Justice Studies at Appalachian State 
University. 
 
Willow S. Jacobson (PhD, Syracuse University) is an Associate Professor at UNC School of 
Government. She teaches in the Master of Public Administration program and directs the Local 
Government Federal Credit Union Fellows program which focuses on executive development 
and leadership training. 
